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the	 psychometric	 g,	 which	 is	 used	 to	 estimate	 reasoning	 ability	 and	 cognitive	 flexibility,	 i.e.	23 
general	intelligence.	To	better	understand	the	evolution	of	general	intelligence,	it	is	important	to	24 
identify	 the	presence	of	a	psychometric	g	 in	nonhuman	animals,	especially	 in	primates,	and	 to	25 
further	 disentangle	 the	 influences	 affecting	 its	 development.	 We	 therefore	 investigated	 the	26 
cognitive	 abilities	 of	 53	 Bornean	 and	 Sumatran	 orangutans	 to	 assess	 the	 presence	 of	 a	27 
psychometric	g,	 and	 to	 explore	possible	 influences	on	 its	 expression.	We	did	 so	using	 a	 set	 of	28 
carefully	selected	physical	cognition	 tasks	addressing	abilities	of	 inhibitory	control,	behavioral	29 
flexibility,	causal	reasoning,	tool	use,	and	associative-	and	reversal	learning,	and	presented	tasks	30 
to	 the	subjects	 in	 the	absence	of	human	experimenters.	A	principal	 component	analysis	of	 the	31 
individuals’	 performances	 revealed	 a	 single	 component,	 which	 accounted	 for	 31%	 of	 the	32 
individual	 variation	 in	 task	 performance.	 This	 g	 could	 not	 be	 explained	 by	 non-cognitive	33 
confounding	 variables,	 such	 as	 health	 status,	 island	 of	 origin,	 or	 rearing	 background.	34 
Furthermore,	we	 found	 a	modest	 correlation	 between	 an	 individual’s	 independently	 assessed	35 
curiosity	 and	 g,	 which	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	 notion	 that	 accumulating	 experience	 affects	 the	36 
developmental	 construction	 of	 g.	 Together,	 our	 results	 suggest	 there	 is	 evidence	 for	 general	37 











flexibility,	 to	 think	 abstractly,	 and	 comprehend	 complex	 ideas;	 it	 is	 thought	 to	 be	 based	 on	47 
reasoning,	 problem-solving,	 planning,	 and	 learning	 from	 experience	 (Gottfredson	 1997).	 For	48 
over	 a	 century,	 theories	 of	 general	 intelligence	 relied	 on	 the	 reliable	 emergence	 of	 a	 single	49 




represents	 a	 latent	 variable	 or	 rather	 some	 emerging	 property	 (cf.	 Burkart	 et	 al.	 2017),	 and	54 
about	 how	 g	 is	 related	 and	 contributing	 to	 cognitive	 processes	 (Conway	 and	 Kovacs	 2015).	55 
Carroll	 (2003),	 Geary	 (2005),	 and	 Horn	 and	 McArdle	 (2007)	 argue	 in	 favor	 of	 either	 some	56 




some	 system-level	 property	 affecting	 overall	 cognitive	 performance	 across	 a	 broad	 array	 of	61 
tasks.		62 
Cognitive	abilities	are	developmentally	constructed	and	reconstructed	(Vygotsky	1978).	63 
Intelligence	 can	 therefore	 be	 shaped	 by	 socio-cultural	 influences	 (Neisser	 et	 al.	 1996,	 Nisbett	64 
2009,	Nisbett	et	al.	2012,	Flynn	2016)	and	cognitive	performance	by	specific	experiences	during	65 
development	(Reyes-García	et	al.	2016).	These	experience	effects	could	also	explain	the	positive	66 
relation	 between	 motivation,	 including	 curiosity	 and	 persistence,	 and	 general	 cognitive	67 
performance	as	suggested	by	Gottfried	(1990):	Depending	on	how	an	individual	approaches	its	68 
surroundings,	e.g.	with	high	curiosity	or	great	social	interest,	it	will	experience	different	learning	69 
opportunities.	The	 accumulation	of	 these	 experiences	 can	 influence	 an	 individual’s	 knowledge	70 
and	was	 suggested	 as	 explanation	 for	 the	 effect	 of	 early	 novelty	 seeking	 in	 human	 infants	 on	71 
subsequent	IQ	development	(Bornstein	and	Sigman	1986,	Vietze	and	Coates	1986).	72 
It	 has	 traditionally	 been	 assumed,	 usually	 implicitly,	 that	 general	 intelligence	 is	 a	73 
phylogenetically	derived	feature	of	humans,	and	therefore	unique	to	our	species.	However,	there	74 
is	 a	 rapidly	 expanding	 literature	 investigating	 domain-general	 cognitive	 ability	 in	 nonhuman	75 
animals	 (reviewed	 in	 Burkart	 et	 al.	 2017).	 In	 nonhuman	 animals	 intelligence	 can	 be	 broadly	76 
defined	 as	 the	 ability	 to	 acquire	 and	 utilize	 knowledge	 to	 organize	 effective	 behavior	 in	 both	77 
familiar	 and	 novel	 contexts,	 and	 thus	 to	 behave	 flexibly	 (Byrne	 1994,	 Yoerg	 2001,	 Rumbaugh	78 
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and	 Washburn	 2003).	 An	 open	 question	 in	 animals	 therefore	 is	 to	 what	 extent	 intelligence,	79 
broadly	defined,	corresponds	to	a	potential	psychometrically	derived	g-factor.	80 
One	major	 source	 of	 evidence	 in	 favor	 of	 a	 psychometric	 general	 factor	 in	 nonhuman	81 
animals	 is	 provided	 by	 interspecific	 patterns,	 where	 species	 differences	 in	 cognitive	82 
performance	on	a	wide	variety	of	tests	can	largely	be	captured	by	a	single	variable	(Deaner	et	al.	83 
2006,	Reader	et	al.	2011).	Here,	we	refer	to	this	 interspecific	 factor	as	G,	 to	distinguish	it	 from	84 
the	 intraspecific	g.	 Because	 this	G	measure	 is	 tightly	 correlated	with	 brain	 size	 (Deaner	 et	 al.	85 
2007)	 and	 inhibitory	 control	 (MacLean	 et	 al.	 2014;	 see	 Burkart	 et	 al.	 2017),	 both	 known	86 
correlates	of	g	 in	humans	(Deary	et	al.	2010,	Meldrum	et	al.	2017),	 it	probably	expresses	very	87 
similar	 abilities	 as	 the	 intraspecific	 g	 measure.	 Additionally,	 an	 increasing	 number	 of	 studies	88 
addresses	the	existence	of	a	psychometric	g	within	a	variety	of	different	taxa	(reviews:	Chabris	89 
2007,	Matzel	 et	 al.	 2011,	 Burkart	 et	 al.	 2017),	 including	 dogs	 (Arden	 and	Adams	 2016),	mice	90 
(Galsworthy	et	 al.	2002,	Locurto	et	 al.	2003,	Matzel	 et	 al.	2003,	Matzel	 et	 al.	2011,	Wass	et	 al.	91 
2012,	Matzel	et	al.	2017),	 rats	 (Anderson	1993),	bowerbirds	(Keagy	et	al.	2011),	New	Zealand	92 
Robins	 (Shaw	 et	 al.	 2015),	 cotton-top	 tamarins	 (Banerjee	 et	 al.	 2009),	 rhesus	 macaques	93 
(Herndon	et	al.	1997),	and	chimpanzees	(Herrmann	et	al.	2010,	Hopkins	et	al.	2014,	Woodley	of	94 
Menie	et	al.	2015).		95 
Although	 these	 animal	 studies	may	 appear	 to	 settle	 the	matter,	 many	 of	 them	 can	 be	96 
criticized.	Most	 have	methodological	 limitations	 that	 need	 to	 be	 dealt	with	 before	 concluding	97 
that	there	is	evidence	of	g.	There	is	a	serious	risk	of	a	false	positive	result,	for	instance	because	a	98 
test-battery	 is	 applied	 where	 multiple	 tests	 all	 basically	 measure	 similar	 problem-solving	99 
abilities,	 or	 because	 studies	 do	 not	 control	 for	 individual	 variation	 in	 health,	 motivation,	 or	100 
habituation	 (Burkart	et	al.	2017).	Alternatively,	 the	existence	of	g	can	be	masked,	e.g.	 through	101 
small	 sample	 sizes,	 or	 if	 many	 tasks	 are	 included	 that	 are	 automatized	 during	 ontogeny	102 
(experience-dependent),	 and	 thus	 undergo	 so-called	 secondary	modularization	 (Burkart	 et	 al.	103 
2017).	 Furthermore,	 as	 in	 human	 studies,	 we	 have	 to	 expect	 the	 correlations	 among	 the	104 
performance	 scores	 on	 various	 tests	 to	 be	 modest,	 meaning	 that	 all	 animal	 studies	 are	105 
statistically	 underpowered	 (it	 took	 massive	 meta-analyses	 to	 convince	 critics	 of	 human	106 
intelligence	studies:	Carroll	1993).		107 
But	even	reliably	identifying	a	psychometric	g	 in	an	animal	test	battery	does	not	per	se	108 
guarantee	 that	 this	 g	 corresponds	 to	 intelligence	 broadly	 defined,	 i.e.	 general	 intelligence.	109 
Rather,	additional	validation	tests	are	necessary,	as	done	for	humans,	and	to	some	extent	mice	110 
(e.g.	Matzel	et	al.	2006,	Matzel	et	al.	2011).	111 
The	 purpose	 of	 this	 study	was	 to	 examine	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 psychometric	 g	 factor	 in	112 




such	 as	 flexible	 tool	 use	 (van	 Schaik	 2004),	 planning	 (van	 Schaik	 et	 al.	 2013)	 and	 large	115 
innovation	repertoires	in	the	wild	(van	Schaik	et	al.	2006),	as	well	as	problem-solving	abilities	in	116 
zoological	 gardens	 (Lethmate	 1977,	 Lehner	 et	 al.	 2011).	 Orangutans	 also	 show	 extended	117 
development	and	a	 long	phase	of	socially	mediated	 learning	 (Schuppli	et	al.	2016a)	 to	acquire	118 
their	 geographically	 variable	 skill	 repertoires	 (van	 Schaik	 et	 al.	 1996,	 van	 Schaik	 et	 al.	 2003,	119 





sample	 of	 106	 individuals	 over	 multiple	 social	 and	 non-social	 tasks.	 Their	 factor	 model	125 
described	 two	distinct	 areas:	 the	 spatial	 and	 the	physical-social	 area.	Hopkins	et	 al.	 (2014),	 in	126 
contrast,	 derived	 a	 factor	 representing	 g	 using	 a	 broad	 intelligence	 battery	 based	 on	 similar	127 
methods	(Herrmann	et	al.	2007)	with	99	individuals.	Woodly	of	Menie	et	al.	(2015)	reanalyzed	128 
the	 same	 dataset	 and	 corroborated	 the	 earlier	 interpretations	 for	 the	 presence	 of	 g	 in	129 
chimpanzees.	 In	 light	 of	 the	 different	 analytical	 procedures	 of	 the	 two	 sets	 of	 studies,	 the	130 
interpretation	of	 the	presence	of	g	 in	 chimpanzees	now	appears	 to	be	 the	most	parsimonious	131 
one.	 In	 fact,	Beran	and	Hopkins	 (2018)	 report	 evidence	 for	g	 based	on	an	unrotated	principal	132 
component	analysis,	which	as	in	humans,	is	related	to	self-control.		133 
However,	in	light	of	the	criticism	of	other	animal	results	discussed	above,	a	conservative	134 




This	 study	 introduced	 several	 novel	 features.	 First,	 the	 tasks	 were	 presented	 to	 the	139 
orangutans	in	the	absence	of	human	experimenters,	to	prevent	any	bias	in	favor	of	individual’s	140 
familiarity	with	humans	which	might	 result	 in	 a	 false	positive	 result	 (see	also	Schubiger	 et	 al.	141 
2015).	 Second,	 the	 tasks	 in	 this	 study	 were	 carefully	 selected	 to	 minimize	 overlap	 in	 their	142 
domains,	 and	 to	 include	 abilities	 similar	 to	 ones	 used	 in	 human	 test	 batteries.	 They	 included	143 
tasks	 addressing	 flexibility,	 inhibitory/control,	 causal	 reasoning,	 reversal	 learning	 and	 goal	144 




showing	 the	 presence	 of	 general	 intelligence,	 the	 second	 aim	 of	 this	 study	 was	 to	 conduct	149 
validation	 tests	 to	 evaluate	 such	 a	 preliminary	 conclusion.	 First,	 we	 asked	 whether	 the	150 
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orangutan	g	 could	 be	 an	 artifact	 of	 alternative	 non-cognitive	 factors	 possibly	 generating	 false	151 
positive	results,	such	as	health,	sex,	rearing	background,	and	island	of	origin	of	the	individuals.	152 
Second,	general	intelligence	in	humans	is	highly	responsive	to	early	experiences	available	to	an	153 
individual	 (see	 above).	 We	 recently	 found	 that	 in	 orangutans	 a	 curious	 response-and-154 
exploration	 style	 (resulting	 from	 previous	 care	 by	 humans	 and	 social	 housing)	 was	 the	 sole	155 
predictor	 for	 performance	 on	 each	 of	 the	 problem	 solving	 tasks	 used	 in	 this	 study	 separately	156 
(Damerius	et	al.	2017).	Individuals	with	a	long	history	of	curiosity	can	accumulate	physical	and	157 
social	 experiences	 and	 improve	 their	 causal	 understanding	 and	 learning	 ability	 (Byrne	 2016,	158 
Damerius	et	al.	2017).	Thus,	curiosity	might	indeed	channel	the	prospecting	of	novel	social	and	159 








The	 study	 included	 40	 Bornean	 (Pongo	 pygmaeus	 wurmbii)	 and	 13	 Sumatran	 (Pongo	168 
abelii)	orangutans	housed	at	rehabilitation	stations	in	Indonesia,	of	which	23	were	females	and	169 




driven	performance,	we	only	 included	subjects	who	passed	 the	criterion	of	having	 touched	all	174 
tasks	at	least	once.	This	resulted	in	a	conservative	sample	size	of	53	individuals	with	no	missing	175 




The	 individuals	varied	 in	background,	although	all	were	wild-born	(see	Supplementary	180 
Table	 S1).	 This	 heterogeneity	 of	 background	 experiences	 of	 the	 individuals	 allowed	 us	 to	181 
examine	experiential	 influences	on	g.	We	distinguished	four	categories	of	 individuals.	The	first	182 
category	 (‘human’)	 included	 individuals,	who	had	 stayed	with	 humans	 for	 at	 least	 six	months	183 











LD,	ZK	and	a	 trained	assistant	 (Andreas	Wendl)	 collected	 the	data	between	 June	2012	193 
and	 June	2014	 in	 four	 facilities	of	 three	organizations	across	Sumatra	and	Central	Kalimantan,	194 
Borneo.	195 
The	 Sumatran	 orangutans	 (Pongo	 abelii)	were	 studied	 at	 (a)	 the	 quarantine	 station	 in	196 
Batu	M'Belin	 (QBM)	of	 the	Sumatran	Orangutan	Conservation	Program	(SOCP),	Medan,	North-197 
Sumatra.	8	subjects	were	part	of	our	study	(2	females,	6	males).	Their	ages	ranged	from	5	to	10	198 
years	 and	 we	 tested	 them	 in	 their	 home	 enclosures,	 as	 they	 were	 housed	 solitary.		199 
(b)	One	 solitarily	male	 and	 4	 socially	 housed	 females	 stationed	 at	 the	 release	 site	Danau	Alo,	200 
Bukit	Tigapuluh,	Jambi,	Sumatra	were	part	of	our	study.	They	were	between	3	to	6	years	of	age.	201 
The	 release	 site	 belongs	 to	 SOCP	 and	 individuals	 are	 transferred	 here	 from	 the	 QBM.	 The	202 
Bornean	 orangutans	 (Pongo	 pygmaeus)	 were	 studied	 at	 (c)	 the	 Orangutan	 Care	 Center	 and	203 
Quarantine	 (OCCQ)	 in	 Pasir	 Panjang,	 Central	 Kalimantan.	 This	 facility	 is	 managed	 by	 the	204 
Orangutan	Foundation	 International	 (OFI).	The	26	 subjects'	 ages	 ranged	 from	8	 to	14.5	years,	205 
with	10	females	and	16	males.	Testing	occurred	in	external	test	cages,	since	all	individuals	were	206 
socially	housed	 in	peer-groups	of	 equal	 sex	 ranging	 from	2	 to	6	 individuals.	 (d)	We	 tested	14	207 









human	 caretakers,	 that	 served	 as	 surrogate	mothers.	 All	 individuals	 on	 both	 islands	 received	217 
food-related	 enrichment	 several	 times	 a	week	and	had	 simple	 enrichment	devices	 installed	 in	218 







tasks	 for	measuring	problem-solving	abilities:	 the	Box	Task,	Detour	Reaching,	Tube	Trap	Task,	224 
Honey	Tool	Task	and	Reversal	Learning.	These	five	tasks	were	meant	to	cover	distinct	cognitive	225 
abilities,	namely	flexibility	response,	inhibition,	causal	reasoning,	tool	use,	and	reversal	learning,	226 
including	 associative	 learning	 and	 memory.	 We	 focused	 on	 performance	 measures	 that	 best	227 
reflected	 possible	 components	 of	 domain-general	 cognitive	 processes,	 and	 thus	 avoided	228 
measures	that	might	reflect	success	based	on	trial-and-error	exploration.	We	aimed	at	applying	229 
various	 tasks	 of	 different	 cognitive	 domains,	 to	 minimize	 the	 risk	 of	 re-sampling	 the	 same	230 




once.	 Testing	 occurred	 on	 consecutive	 days	 and	 on	 a	 specially	 designed	 presentation	 table	235 
(Supplementary	Fig.	S1).	For	every	facility	we	used	the	same	experimental	tasks	and	procedures	236 
with	minor	modifications	 of	 the	 presentation	 table	 (adjustment	 in	 size	 and	 fixation)	 to	 fit	 the	237 
conditions	of	each	facility.	The	individuals	were	able	to	interact	on	a	voluntarily	basis	with	the	238 
apparatus	 since	 it	was	 presented	 from	 the	 outside	 of	 the	 enclosure.	 This	way,	 the	 individuals	239 
were	 able	 to	 reach	 through	 the	mesh	 or	 bars	 to	 freely	 explore	 the	 apparatus.	 No	 human	was	240 











fulfilled	 the	criterion	 for	 learning	when	 four	out	of	 five	boxes	were	 flipped	open.	 Immediately	252 
after	 passing	 the	 Learning	 phase	 the	 individuals	 were	 presented	 the	 second	 condition	 of	 the	253 














subject	 could	 not	 reach	 for	 the	 fruit/object	 directly,	 but	 had	 to	make	 the	 detour	 through	 the	266 
large	opening.	Therefore,	 the	 individual	had	to	 inhibit	grasping	 for	the	putative	direct	solution	267 
and	control	reaching	around	to	retrieve	the	reward.	The	performance	measure	was	the	latency	268 










food	 was	 moved	 to	 the	 trap,	 the	 food	 fell	 into	 the	 trap	 and	 could	 no	 longer	 be	 retrieved	279 
(Supplementary	Fig.	S4,a).	The	subjects	had	to	learn	this	causal	relation	and	to	slide	the	food	in	280 
the	 correct	 direction	 (Supplementary	Fig.	 S4,b).	 In	 three	 consecutive	 trials	 for	 4	min	 each	 the	281 












the	 channels	 (Supplementary	 Fig.	 S5).	 For	 10	 min	 the	 subject	 was	 presented	 with	 the	292 
opportunity	to	fish	for	honey	out	of	the	two	channels.	An	individual	could	not	reach	the	honey	293 





use	 an	 ordinal	 scale	 to	measure	 performance,	 because	 the	 data	 fitted	 a	 Guttman	 scale,	which	299 
showed	a	 reproducibility	 coefficient	 close	 to	one	 (0.92),	with	71%	 individuals	perfectly	 fitting	300 
the	 applied	 Guttman	 scale	 (listed	 from	 simplest	 to	most	 complex).	 The	 following	 scores	were	301 
used:	 1)	 inserting	 finger	 in	 either	 of	 the	 channel,	 2)	 tracing	 the	 honey	 in	 the	 channel	 from	302 
outside	(revealing	their	understanding	that	there	is	honey	insight),	3)	inserting	tools	in	either	of	303 
the	 channels,	4)	 goal-directed	 tool	use	outside	 (directly	 aiming	 for	 the	honey	with	 the	 correct	304 






Reversal	 learning	 is	 a	 widely	 used	 paradigm	 for	 assessing	 associative	 learning	 and	309 
reversal	learning	abilities	(reviewed	in	Izquierdo	et	al.	2016).	At	first	the	subjects	learn	that	one	310 
possible	 combination	 of	 two	 stimuli	 (e.g.	 location,	 color)	 is	 linked	 to	 a	 reward	 whereas	 the	311 
second	 one	 is	 not.	 Once	 the	 individual	 has	 associated	 the	 first	 stimulus	 with	 the	 reward	 the	312 
contingency	is	reversed	and	the	first	stimulus	no	longer	indicates	the	reward,	but	the	second	one	313 
does.	 In	 the	current	 study	 the	presentation	board	was	equipped	on	either	 side	with	 six	 round	314 
white	and	six	square	black	doors	(Supplementary	Fig.	S6).	The	doors	could	be	swung	open	by	315 
turning	 them	 to	 the	 right	 or	 to	 the	 left	 and	 gave	way	 a	 small	 space.	 Behind	 each	 door	 of	 one	316 
randomly	 determined	 side	 the	 space	 was	 baited	 with	 a	 peanut.	 Therefore	 the	 subject	 was	317 
rewarded,	when	 opening	 a	 baited	 door.	 The	 task	 for	 the	 subject	was	 to	 learn	 the	 association	318 
between	food	and	location,	which	was	enhanced	by	the	different	shapes	and	colors	of	the	doors.	319 
If	 the	 subject	 opened	 at	 least	 five	 out	 of	 the	 first	 six	 doors	 at	 the	 correct	 location	 on	 two	320 






We	 constructed	 an	 ordinal	 scale	 to	 measure	 performance	 on	 the	 three	 consecutive	327 
components:	 learning,	memory	and	reversal	 learning.	 Individuals	that	did	not	achieve	 learning	328 
received	a	performance	score	of	0,	individuals	that	were	able	to	learn	but	failed	subsequent	tests	329 





variation	 in	 curiosity.	 Each	 individual’s	 level	 of	 curiosity	 was	 assessed	 through	 five	 different	335 
tasks,	including	a	novel	object	test,	human	orientation	tasks,	reactions	toward	a	snake	predator	336 
model	 and	 reactions	 to	 both	 familiar	 and	 novel	 food.	 Each	 task	 lasted	 two	minutes	 and	 was	337 
presented	 separately	 from	 the	 outside	 of	 the	 enclosure	 without	 any	 experimenter	 present.	 A	338 









handycam	5.3	MP).	The	video	 footage	was	 imported	 into	 the	program	Interact,	version	9.7.5.0	346 
(©	Mangold	International	GmbH)	for	transformation	and	coding	of	the	cognitive	performance	by	347 
LD.	Data	on	exploration	and	novelty	 responses	were	also	coded	by	LD,	apart	 from	some	 tasks	348 
used	to	generate	the	curiosity	score,	which	were	coded	by	a	trained	assistant	(Anna	Schöpfer).	349 
LD	 and	 the	 assistant	 independently	 coded	 21%	 of	 the	 videos	 and	 came	 to	 a	 good	 inter-rater	350 
agreement	(Cohen’s	Kappa:	0.701;	N	responses=	185,	P	<0.001).	351 
First,	 we	 used	 descriptive	 statistics	 (means	 with	 standard	 deviation	 or	 medians	 with	352 
minimum	 and	 maximum	 values)	 on	 the	 five	 task-specific	 cognitive	 performance	 scores	 to	353 
explore	 the	distribution	of	 the	variance	 in	performance	(Table	1).	The	signs	of	 latencies	of	 the	354 
Detour	Reaching	Task	were	reversed	for	the	model	to	represent	the	ability	of	inhibitory	control.	355 
Second,	we	calculated	Spearman-Rho	correlations	to	estimate	the	relationships	between	356 
the	different	 five	measures	of	 cognitive	performance	 from	 the	 five	different	 tasks.	We	applied	357 
Bonferroni	corrections	on	the	level	of	0.01	(α/N=.05/5).		358 
Third,	 in	 order	 to	 investigate	 the	 psychometric	 structure	 we	 applied	 an	 unrotated	359 
principal	component	analysis	 (PCA)	on	 the	 five	performance	measures	 (Table	1),	 for	both,	 the	360 
conservative	and	extended	data	set	(see	Supplementary	Table	S1).	The	PCAs	were	conducted	in	361 
IBM	 SPSS	 Statistics,	 version	22.0.0.0	 (©	 IBM	Cooperation	 and	 other(s),	 1989,	 2013).	 This	 PCA	362 
method	 was	 chosen	 to	 answer	 the	 primary	 question,	 i.e.	 whether	 there	 are	 across-domain	363 
correlations,	 shared	 variance,	 between	 the	 diverse	 performance	 measures	 and	 to	 how	 many	364 
components	 the	 cognitive	 domains	 can	 be	 reduced.	 We	 subsequently	 performed	 a	 parallel	365 
analysis	 in	 R	 version	 2.1	 (R	 Core	 Team	 2016)	 using	 the	 fa.parallel	 function	 from	 the	 ‘psych’	366 
package	 (Revelle	 2017)	 in	 order	 to	 determine	 the	 number	 of	 significant	 components.	 We	367 
generated	1000	randomly	simulated	data	sets	with	equal	n	and	k	by	resampling	and	generating	368 
random	normal	data.		369 
Additionally,	 to	 assess	 whether	 the	 performance	 variables’	 distributions	 affected	 the	370 
outcome	 of	 a	 psychometric	 structure	 of	 g,	 we	 ranked	 each	 subject’s	 performance	 within	 any	371 
given	 task	 and	 performed	 an	 additional	 PCA	 (presented	 in	 the	 Supplementary	 Material).	372 
Subjects	 with	 the	 best	 performance	 received	 the	 value	 ‘1’	 whereas	 subjects	 with	 the	 lowest	373 
performance	the	rank	of	‘53’.	Tied	performances	were	given	equal	scores,	such	that	the	median	374 
value	was	 returned	 (overview	 of	measurements	 see	 Supplementary	 Table	 S2).	 For	 additional	375 
investigations	if	the	factorial	method	used	showed	an	effect,	we	conducted	an	exploratory	factor	376 




Fourth,	 we	 used	 Linear	Models	 (LM)	 to	 investigate	whether	 variation	 in	 the	 principal	379 
component	(PC1)	can	be	explained	by	non-cognitive	 factors	such	as	health	characteristics	(e.g.	380 
loss	of	hair	or	stereotypical	behavior	patterns),	species	(island	of	origin),	background,	sex	or	age.	381 
The	 contrasts	 for	 the	 categorical	 predictor	 variables	 Background	 was	 specified	 a	 priori	 to	382 





stations	 and	 backgrounds	 as	 random	 effects,	 and	 the	 principal	 component	 as	 a	 response.	 The	388 







The	 experimental	 protocols	 were	 in	 full	 compliance	 with	 the	 Swiss	 Animal	 Welfare	396 
legislation	 and	 were	 approved	 by	 the	 Indonesian	 Ministry	 of	 Research	 and	 Technology	397 
(RISTEK).	They	also	fully	complied	with	ethical	guidelines	of	each	study	facility	and	followed	the	398 


































































Consistent	 with	 findings	 of	 previous	 human	 studies	 (Carroll	 1993),	 the	 majority	 of	410 
individual	task	performances	were	positively	correlated	in	a	pairwise	comparison	over	all	tasks	411 
(Supplementary	Table	S3).	The	ability	of	Learning,	Remembering,	Reversal	Learning	was	weakly	412 
correlated	 with	 the	 ability	 of	 Causal	 Reasoning	 (Spearman-Rho,	 r=	 .333,	 P=.015,	 N=53)	 and	413 
Flexibility	(Spearman-Rho,	r=	.247,	P<.074,	N=53).	After	Bonferroni	correction	(at	a	significance	414 
level	of	p<	.01	[α/N=.05/5]),	none	of	the	correlations	remained	significant.	There	was	one,	very	415 
weak,	 negative	 correlation	 between	 Tool	 Use	 and	 Learning/Remembering/Reversal	 Learning	416 




Across	 the	 five	 different	 cognitive	 tasks,	 the	 potential	 overlap	 of	 the	 cognitive	421 
performances	 was	 assessed	 using	 an	 unrotated	 Principal	 Component	 Analysis	 (PCA).	 Parallel	422 
analysis	revealed	that	only	the	first	component	(PC1)	could	be	extracted	(its	eigenvalue	of	1.56	423 
exceeded	 the	 95th	 percentile	 of	 the	 eigenvalues	 obtained	 from	 randomly	 generated	 data,	 see	424 
15 
 
also	 Supplementary	 Fig.	 S7).	 This	 PC1	 explained	 31.28%	 of	 the	 variation	 in	 orangutan	425 









an	 exploratory	 factor	 analysis	 (EFA).	 In	 both	 analyses,	 the	 results	 of	 the	 first	 component	 or	435 
factor	 are	 very	 similar	 in	 their	 magnitude	 and	 orientation	 of	 the	 item	 loadings	 (see	436 
Supplementary	 Tables	 S5	 and	 S6).	 The	 main	 difference	 was	 that	 the	 percentage	 of	 shared	437 
variance	for	the	first	component	was	slightly	lower	in	the	EFA;	this	difference	between	EFA	and	438 
PCA	 is	 not	 surprising	 considering	 their	 different	 communality	 estimates,	 the	 low	 number	 of	439 
variables	(respectively	for	statistical	methods),	and	low	communalities	(<0.4)	of	the	sample	(but	440 
see	Stevens	2002,	Field	2013	p.	638).	In	conclusion,	we	found	robust	evidence	for	the	presence	441 























N	=	 53,	 rotation	 =	 none.	 Principal	 component	 (PC)	




We	 next	 tested	 whether	 alternative	 non-cognitive	 factors	 possibly	 explain	 the	 PC1	447 
scores,	 which	 we	 interpreted	 as	 g.	 Table	 3	 shows	 the	 results	 of	 a	 Linear	 Model	 of	 the	 PC1.	448 
Because	the	sample	size	did	not	allow	us	to	simultaneously	include	all	independent	variables	of	449 
interest,	such	as	health,	we	repeated	the	analysis	with	health	characteristics	included,	instead	of	450 
age	 (Supplementary	Table	S7).	All	 analyses	and	other	 combinations	of	 replaced	variables	 (not	451 
reported	 here)	 showed	 similar	 robust	 results.	 First,	 there	 was	 no	 significant	 effect	 of	 age.	452 












		 Estimate	 Std.	Error	 P	value	
(Intercept)	 -0.105	 0.65	 0.874	
Age	 0.023	 0.06	 0.706	
Sex	(male)	 -0.034	 0.27	 0.902	
Background	
						Wild	vs.	Others	 -0.059	 0.18	 0.740	
						Others	vs.	Unknown	 -0.032	 0.10	 0.762	
						Station	vs.	Human	 0.103	 0.23	 0.655	
Rehabilitation	Station	
						Sumatra	vs.	Borneo	 0.238	 0.16	 0.153	









We	 aimed	 at	 investigating	 whether	 experiential	 effects	 have	 an	 influence	 on	 the	465 
development	of	the	possible	domain-general	ability	captured	by	PC1.	Therefore,	we	tested	over	466 
52	orangutans	 (one	 individual	had	no	curiosity	 score)	 the	 influence	of	 curiosity	on	PC1,	when	467 
controlling	 the	 linear	 mixed	 effect	 model	 for	 other	 potential	 experiential	 effects	 such	 as	 age,	468 













the	 sample	 of	 the	 remaining	 50	 non-wild	 individuals,	 an	 individual’s	 curiosity	 positively	478 
influenced	PC1	scores	(the	g)	in	orangutans	(Estimate	±	SE=	0.541±0.26,	P=0.0467,	Table	5,	Fig.	479 







Estimate	 SE	 df	 t	value		 p	value	
(Intercept)	 0.028	 0.64	 7.83	 0.04	 0.966	
Age	 0.007	 0.05	 18.85	 0.13	 0.896	






Estimate	 SE	 df	 t	value		 p	value	
(Intercept)	 -0.153	 0.60	 5.27	 -0.26	 0.807	
Age	 0.012	 0.05	 9.32	 0.22	 0.829	













We	 investigated	 the	 cognitive	 abilities	 of	 53	 Bornean	 and	 Sumatran	 orangutans	 by	488 
comparing	 their	 performance	 over	 multiple	 physical	 cognition	 tasks	 addressing	 abilities	 of	489 
inhibitory	 control,	 behavioral	 flexibility,	 causal	 reasoning,	 tool	 use,	 and	 reversal	 learning,	490 
including	associative	learning	and	memory.	Individual	performance	on	these	tasks	was	generally	491 
positively	 correlated	 across	 these	 tasks,	 and	 an	 unrotated	 principal	 component	 analysis	492 
indicated	 that	 the	 first	 component	 accounted	 for	 31%	 of	 the	 individual	 variation	 in	 task	493 
performance	of	orangutans.	All	variables	showed	positive	factor	loadings	on	the	first	PC.	494 
Although	 the	 five	 physical	 tasks	 of	 the	 test-battery	 were	 designed	 to	 measure	495 
independent	 abilities	 and	 minimize	 the	 transfer	 of	 experience	 between	 the	 tasks,	 one	496 
component	 explained	 a	 third	 of	 the	 variance	 in	 individual	 performance.	 The	 performance	 in	497 
associative	 learning,	memory,	 reversal	 learning,	 causal	 reasoning,	 behavior	 flexibility	 and	 tool	498 
use	all	 loaded	positively	on	PC1	(Table	2).	 In	other	words,	 individuals	performing	well	on	one	499 







comparable	 to	 that	 found	 in	 humans.	 This	 conclusion	 is	 based	 on	 a	 small	 number	 of	 tests.	505 
However,	 we	 focused	 on	 highly	 conservative	 measures	 to	 minimize	 possible	 statistical	506 
dependencies.	For	instance,	the	reversal-learning	test	contains	three	phases,	which	have	nearly	507 
independent	 components	 and	provides	 additional	 information	about	performance.	Thus,	 if	we	508 
include	 associative	 learning	 as	 a	 separate	 measure	 into	 the	 principal	 component	 analysis	 to	509 
additionally	consider	the	quality	of	 learning	and	not	only	whether	they	learned	or	not,	we	find	510 
that	 the	 loadings	 remain	 quite	 similar	 (Supplementary	 Table	 S8).	 This	 result,	 taken	 together	511 













Our	 findings	 are	 generally	 in	 line	with	 the	majority	 of	 previous	 findings	 in	 nonhuman	525 
animals	 (e.g.	 Herndon	 et	 al.	 1997,	 Matzel	 et	 al.	 2006,	 Hopkins	 et	 al.	 2014).	 They	 are	 also	526 
consistent	with	recent	studies	in	chimpanzees.	These	studies	increasingly	report	evidence	for	g,	527 
which,	in	addition	and	like	in	humans,	is	related	to	independently	assessed	self-control	(Beran	&	528 
Hopkins	 2018).	 Intriguingly,	 these	 results	 are	 based	 on	 a	 very	 similar	 test	 battery	 (the	 PCTB,	529 
Herrmann	et	al.	2007)	which	also	includes	socio-cognitive	tasks.	This	may	suggest	that	earlier,	530 
contradicting	conclusions	(e.g.	Herrmann	et	al.	2010,	Herrmann	and	Call	2012)	are	the	result	of	531 
different	 analytical	 techniques	 (e.g.	 confirmatory	 factor	 analyses	 vs	 un-rotated	 PCA	 analyses:	532 
Herrmann	et	al.	2010)	rather	than	the	inclusion	of	socio-cognitive	tasks	in	the	battery.		To	allow	533 
for	 comparisons	of	 studies	of	 different	 species,	 it	 therefore	 appears	 crucial	 to	 standardize	not	534 
only	test	batteries	and	minimal	sample	sizes,	but	also	analytical	techniques.	535 
In	what	 follows,	we	 focus	 on	 the	 role	 of	 experiential	 factors,	 such	 as	 curiosity,	 for	 the	536 








that	 also	 had	 an	 eigenvalue	 >	 1	 but	 was	 not	 extracted	 according	 to	 the	 more	 conservative	543 
parallel	 analysis).	A	 similar	pattern	has	been	 reported	 for	 chimpanzees	 (Hopkins	 et	 al,	 2014).	544 
This	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	 fact	 that	 tool-use	 abilities	 are	 prone	 to	 be	 automatized	 during	545 
ontogeny,	representing	so-called	secondary	modules	that	are	experience-dependent	(Burkart	et	546 
al.	 2017).	 To	 illustrate	 this	 point,	 consider	 a	 human	 example:	 if	 we	 were	 to	 compare	 bicycle	547 
riders	with	 those	who	never	 learned	 to	 ride	a	bicycle,	we	would	 find	no	difference	 in	average	548 
performance	on	a	variety	of	tasks,	but	would	find	one	for	tasks	that	involved	bicycle	riding.	549 
Previous	 studies	 suggested	 that	 curiosity	 underlies	 problem-solving	 performance	 in	550 
orangutans	 (Damerius	 et	 al.	 2017).	 The	 results	 of	 this	 study	 show	 that	 curiosity	 has	 only	 a	551 
modest	effect	on	g	(Table	5;	Figure	2),	consistent	with	the	presence	of	domain-general	cognitive	552 
abilities.	 Intelligence	 is	 obviously	 influenced	 by	many	 factors,	 and	 the	modest	 effect	 indicates	553 
that	 not	 all	 domain-general	 performance	 is	 constructed	 based	 on	 experience	 due	 to	 novelty	554 
seeking	 and	 curious	 exploration.	 Damerius	 et	 al.	 (2017)	 found	 that	 the	 predictive	 effect	 of	555 
curiosity	on	problem-solving	was	 strongest	 for	 tasks	where	 trial-and-error	exploration,	 rather	556 
than	 causal	 comprehension,	 could	 facilitate	 finding	 the	 solution.	 Nonetheless,	 when	 this	557 








test	 scores	 of	 important	 problem	 solving	 components,	 such	 as	 the	 abilities	 of	 memorizing,	566 
associative	 learning,	 spatial	 flexibility	 and	 causal	 reasoning.	 The	 core	 definition	 of	 general	567 
intelligence	 captures	 exactly	 these	 logical	 problem-solving	 functions,	 reasoning-	 and	 learning	568 
abilities.	 In	addition,	 the	 link	of	g	 and	curiosity	emphasizes	 the	developmental	 construction	of	569 
general-cognitive	 abilities.	 The	 experiences	 during	 development	 biased	 the	 outcome	 of	 across	570 
task	performance	in	orangutans,	as	it	is	expected	for	general	intelligence	in	humans.	Thus,	g	in	571 




We	 conclude	 that	 both	 the	 content	 and	psychometric	 structure	 of	 orangutan	 cognitive	574 
abilities	 are	 comparable	 to	 those	 of	 humans.	 The	 evidence	 for	 g	 in	 orangutans	 allows	 us	 to	575 
assume	 an	 evolutionary	 continuity	 in	 domain-general	 processes	 shared	 between	 humans	 and	576 
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Amin	 male	 6	 Pongo	abelii	 unknown	 conservative	
Andalas	 female	 3	 Pongo	abelii	 unknown	 conservative	
Ari	 male	 10	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 human	 conservative	
Ayu	 female	 6	 Pongo	abelii	 unknown	 conservative	
Bahruni	 male	 10	 Pongo	abelii	 wild	 conservative	
Bambang	 male	 10.5	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 human	 conservative	
Bella	 female	 14.5	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 unknown	 conservative	
Cantik	 female	 10	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 unknown	 conservative	
Ceky	Chan	 male	 6	 Pongo	abelii	 human	 conservative	
Cici	 female	 15	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 unknown	 conservative	
Dewa	 male	 12	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 unknown	 conservative	
Dora	 female	 3.5	 Pongo	abelii	 human	 conservative	
Duanne	 male	 10	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 unknown	 conservative	
Edwin	 male	 11.5	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 unknown	 conservative	
Embrie	 female	 10	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 unknown	 conservative	
Franky	 male	 7	 Pongo	abelii	 unknown	 conservative	
Friend	 male	 5.5	 Pongo	abelii	 unknown	 conservative	
Galih	 male	 10	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 human	 conservative	
Harry	 male	 8.5	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 station	 conservative	
Hulu	 male	 14	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 human	 conservative	
Imas	 female	 9.5	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 human	 conservative	
Jack2	 male	 9	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 human	 conservative	
Jacky	 female	 5	 Pongo	abelii	 human	 conservative	
Janu	 male	 6	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 unknown	 conservative	
Jarot	 male	 5	 Pongo	abelii	 station	 conservative	
Jill	 male	 8	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 station	 conservative	
Julius	 male	 5	 Pongo	abelii	 human	 conservative	
Karan	 female	 10	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 unknown	 conservative	
Karen	 female	 15	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 unknown	 conservative	
King	 male	 17	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 unknown	 conservative	
Kraba	 female	 12	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 unknown	 conservative	
Lanang	 male	 11	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 station	 conservative	
Mawoto	 male	 17	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 unknown	 conservative	
Mercedes	 female	 12	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 unknown	 conservative	
Natalie	 female	 11	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 unknown	 conservative	
Niken	 female	 16	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 unknown	 conservative	
Oracle	 male	 8.5	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 station	 conservative	
29 
 
Otong	 male	 13	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 unknown	 conservative	
Pilar	 female	 11	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 human	 conservative	
Roma	 female	 17	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 unknown	 conservative	
Rowland	 male	 10	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 unknown	 conservative	
Runtu	 female	 13	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 human	 conservative	
Sabin	 male	 9.5	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 station	 conservative	
Sarimin	 male	 11	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 unknown	 conservative	
Sule	 female	 7	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 unknown	 conservative	
Suri	 female	 5	 Pongo	abelii	 human	 conservative	
Trio	 male	 16	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 unknown	 conservative	
Ulin	 female	 14	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 unknown	 conservative	
Victor	 male	 10.5	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 human	 conservative	
Willy	 female	 6	 Pongo	abelii	 human	 conservative	
Winda	 female	 12	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 wild	 conservative	
Yogi	 male	 8	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 station	 conservative	
Zatarra	 male	 10	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 unknown	 conservative	
Gagak	 male	 9.5	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 station	 extended	
(imputed	Box	Task)	
Kasmin	 female	 10.5	 Pongo	pygmaeus	 human	 extended	
(imputed	Box	Task)	
Natalia	 female	 18	 Pongo	abelii	 wild	 extended		
(imputed	Box	Task)	




















Latency	 to	 first	 explore	 non-food	 side	
(show	 inhibit	 behavior);	 largest	 rank	
describes	 best	 performance	 (small	






Guttman	 scale	 of	 goal	 directed	 tool	 use;	
largest	 rank	 describes	 best	 performance	










Scale	 of	 learned,	 remembered,	 reversal	
learned;	 largest	 rank	 describes	 best	
performance	 (successfully	 reversal	 learn-
ing)	 and	 smallest	 worst	 performance	 (no	








Number	 rewards	 retrieved	 in	 all	 three	
trials;	 largest	 rank	 describes	 best	
performance	(highest	number	of	rewards)	




















-	 .027	 .099	 .247	 .060	
Inhibitory	Control	
	 -	 .080	 .116	 .076	
Tool	use	























































































  Estimate	 Std.	Error	 Pr(>|z|)	
(Intercept)	 0.124	 0.27	 0.645	
Health	(yes)	 -0.029	 0.42	 0.946	
Sex	(male)	 -0.033	 0.27	 0.904	
Background	
						Wild	vs.	others	 -0.046	 0.17	 0.790	
						others	vs.	Unknown	 -0.045	 0.10	 0.663	
						Station	vs.	Human	 0.088	 0.23	 0.706	
Rehabilitation	Station	
						Sumatra	vs.	Borneo	 0.191	 0.10	 0.074	






































cm	 x	 H	 110	 –	 160	 cm	 adjustable	 in	 height)	 for	 elevated	
enclosures.	 a)	 The	 presentation	 table	 with	 an	 additional	
board	(L	180	cm	x	W	120	cm	x	D	3	cm)	for	experiments	that	
require	a	vertical	position.	b)	The	table	during	testing	of	the	






























and	 to	 slide	 the	 bait	 along	 the	 tube.	 a)	 Wrong	 direction	 to	
slide	 the	 bait.	 Bait	 falls	 into	 the	 opaque	 trap.	 b)	 Correct	
direction	 to	 slide	 the	 bait.	 Bait	 can	 be	 retrieved	 out	 of	 the	


































Supplementary	 Fig.	 S8:	 The	 relation	 between	
curiosity	and	(PC1)	plotted	with	a	fitted	line	based	
on	 the	 LMM	 (Table	 4)	 over	 all	 individuals	 (n=52).	
The	outlier	on	the	left	was	a	highly	uncurious	wild	
individual.	
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